## 1NC

### 1NC – Kritik

#### White metaphysical sovereignty generates the World as a field of coherence within which it can experience “normal” desires in response to particularized loss. The backbone of this World is the Black Unconscious, the generalized loss of loss itself—Blackness is characterized by desires which are outside of the World, but can only be presenced within the White restrained Unconscious through a murderous ontology that understands Black desires as particular rather than generalized against the World itself.

Eppert, 17—M.A., New York University, Department of Media, Culture and Communication (Nicholas, “(Black) Non-Analysis: From the Restrained Unconscious to the Generalized Unconscious,” Labyrinth, Vol. 19, No. 2, Winter 2017, dml)

The very appearance of (Blacks) in the World is always-already an Anti-Black ontological violence or as Calvin Warren calls it "onticide," a "certain murderous operation through ontology." (Warren 2017, 407) since the being of the Slave is that of "social death" or the complete loss of kinship ties. Because of this metaphysical devastation there is thus a "ruse of analogy" between (Blacks) and Humans. As Wilderson argues, "No slave, no world. And in Addition, as Patterson argues, no slave is in the world. (Wilderson 2010, 11) (Blacks) cannot appear in the World. Humans have the privilege of metaphysical sovereignty and while violence can be done to a Jew, a Jew still has metaphysics, i.e. is still a White Human. The World, or ontology is constitutive of the erasure of (Blackness). This places the figure of the Slave as that by which the World parasites off of, and enjoys its metaphysical sovereignty. The Slave is the condition of the possibility of the World.

I would like to argue that Wilderson's ontological "ruse of analogy" carries over into the distinction between Laruelle's restrained Unconscious and the generalized. There is a ruse of analogy between the (Black) Unconscious and the White Unconscious. In his chapter on "The Narcissistic Slave" Wilderson still ascribes to a restrained view of the Unconscious. For Wilderson, the restrained Unconscious, synonymous with Lacanian analysis, is a (White) Human Unconscious in which (Black) speech is barred. For Wilderson, (Blackness) occupies the violently excluded Real of this Lacanian Unconscious. In this guise, Wilderson still subscribes to what Laruelle calls the restrained Unconscious, insofar as it is an Unconscious that is metaphysically sovereign, the only Unconscious that exists. However, a move to the generalized Unconscious asks what a (Black) desire "murdered" within ontology is like, and attempts to expand the Unconscious. It is important to make the distinction that the (restrained) Unconscious as such is White and not that White Humans have an Unconscious that is distinct from that of empirically black-skinned individuals. Everyone has a White Unconscious insofar as it is a restrained structure that partakes of the metaphysical sovereignty of the White Human. Indeed, as Frantz Fanon wrote of his Martinician compatriots, they underwent a "hallucinatory whitening (Fanon 2008, 80)" or an unconscious desire to be white. For Laruelle, this partakes of a Black/White Dyad that still belongs to the realm of metaphysical sovereignty or the philosophical decision. However, the ontological-psychoanalytic resistance that Laruelle argues that the restrained Unconscious has to the generalized Unconscious is synonymous with the resistance that a White Unconscious has to a (Black) Unconscious. This is a resistance to the One. While in restrained psychoanalysis, resistance is the defense of the ego to avow repressed memories or trauma, Laruelle's concept of a generalized resistance is a defense on the part of the White restrained Unconscious or the White Human to avow the trauma of what Laruelle calls the Stranger or the Victim-in-Person. This takes into account not only the individual's history, but the lived history of the World. Thus, Wilderson's ontological critique must be brought into his critique of the Unconscious. There is a ruse of analogy between the (Black) Unconscious and the White Unconscious.

I will therefore use the terms "White restrained Unconscious" and "(Black) generalized Unconscious" to denote Laruelle's movement from the restrained Unconscious to the generalized Unconscious in tandem with the necessity of the movement from a White Unconscious to a (Black) Unconscious. This move does not argue that all White Humans are hiding a (Black) Unconscious behind their White restrained Unconscious. It rather argues that the conception and science of the Unconscious hitherto formulated has been restrained by the structures of a White metaphysical sovereignty and can only articulate the restricted losses and desires of such a sovereignty. This is simultaneously a metaphysical and political critique. For Lacan, analysis consists of getting the analysand to become conscious of his or her relations with Others, synonymous to a kind of alienation. Wilderson's critique of metaphysics is simultaneously one of Civil Society that repeats itself in the Lacanian Symbolic. The Other that Lacan speaks of, he says, are none other, "in the vernacular most salient to the Slave, Whites and their junior partners in civil society-Humans positioned by the Symbolic order" (Wilderson 2010, 70). The way Civil Society functions is via the metaphysical sovereignty of the White Human and the social death of the (Black) as outlined above. Further, the Symbolic order of the White restrained Unconscious functions similarly as constituting the desires of (Blackness) as socially dead or unable to appear.

Partly at issue here is that under the White restrained Unconscious the only subject that can have losses and desires are those that fall under the subject-positions of the Greek Conscious or the Judaic Other, or the Self/Other dynamic. While Laruelle uses the "Judaic turn" to denote a specific turn within philosophy that takes account of the Other, and not a racialization of philosophy, it is nevertheless the case that what counts as "Other" in this Judaic turn is a question of the Human, i.e. the one who has metaphysics. As Anthony Paul Smith notes, Laruelle's discussion of Judaic thought emphasizes how philosophers like Levinas and Derrida carry out a Judaic turn in philosophy and "their act of resistance to philosophy ends up as susceptible to capture and colonization (my italics) by philosophy." (Smith 2016, 99) For Wilderson, the White Other falls squarely within the policing of Philosophy and Civil Society and it ultimately fails by providing an inept structure of the Unconscious Other by resisting (Blackness) or the One. The Judaic Other provides a picture of mere contingent conflicts, mere family squabbles. Not only does the Unconscious come out as Conscious, and (White) Humans as Human, but (Blackness) comes out as White. The Unconscious is not deep enough, not dark enough. It is too White.

The metaphysical hierarchization between the Greek Consciousness and Judaic Unconscious must then cede to (Blackness) as a generalized Unconscious. The resistance that the restrained Unconscious has to the generalized Unconscious is a resistance of White Unconscious to (Blackness). For Laruelle, non-analysis, "is a way of taking up the problems of the world, of history, of philosophy, rather than those of simple consciousness as psychoanalysis does, but it is a way of taking them up which has some relationship with psychoanalysis." (Laruelle 2015a, 43) This is not to deny that there have been formulations of the White restrained Unconscious and psychoanalysis that take into account the collective unconscious, anthropology, and epiphylogenesis among other things. Rather to take account of the "problems of the world" in non-analysis is to take into account the desires and losses of those who do not appear within the confines of simple consciousness. Here, I endorse Anthony Paul Smith's articulation of the Stranger-Subject or Victim-in-Person as (Black) "to indicate that the identity is not given by the world, that this suspended identity is precisely closer to the Human-in-Human than the white human of philosophy. (Smith 2016, 116) Moving to the (Black) generalized Unconscious will allow for a "dualysis of restrained analysis" (Laruelle 1989, 514) in the or the White Unconscious in the Laruellian sense by transforming it into the material for analysis itself. This allows for an immanent (non)-analysis of the White restrained Unconscious by the (Black) generalized Unconscious. The (Black) generalized Unconscious functions by suspending the desires and objects of the White restrained Unconscious, and while not negating them, place them into reconsideration. (Blackness) or the "(subject) of science is the veritable 'analyst' in what we call 'non'-analysis'. This is an Unconscious without metaphysics, or a (Black) Non-Analysis.

Transference of Restrained Losses and the End of the World

There is a resistance of the White restrained Unconscious to the (Black) generalized Unconscious that is simultaneously a resistance to the One. What is this resistance and what does it entail? Wilderson argues that there is a "structural adjustment" or a move on the part of the Humans of Civil Society to force (Blackness) against its will to appear in the White restrained Unconscious as another member of Civil Society. In an interview conducted after the incidents in Ferguson, Missouri in 2014 and the shooting with Michael Brown, Wilderson says,

Policing—policing Blackness—is what keeps everyone else sane. And if we can start to see the policing and the mutilation and the aggressivity towards Blackness not as a form of discrimination, but as being a form of psychic health and well-being for the rest of the world, then we can begin to reformulate the problem and begin to take a much more iconoclastic response to it. (Wilderson 2014, 7)

There is a way in which repressing or resisting (Blackness) allows one to keep one's sanity or mental health. This is because "normally people are not radical, normally people are not moving against the system: normally people are just trying to live, to have a bit of romance and to feed their kids." (Wilderson 2014, 9) Normal issues such as sanity, eating, loving, feeding kids, typical psychoanalytic issues, are ways of sublimating the fact of (Blackness), ways of policing (Blackness). These are ways of violently forcing (Blackness) to appear in the White restrained Unconscious. We can speak of this as another form of the ontological murder of (Blackness), except this time as the ontological murder of (Black) desires. Within the confines of normal desires, (Black) desires appear as always-already lost. As Jared Ball says, "it's almost like we need to reach out to find people around to the world to link up with. And then unfortunately we're let down when their anti-Blackness takes hold again (Wilderson 2014, 16)". The Others of Civil Society only partner up with (Blacks) until the "normal desires" of the former are attained and then Anti-Blackness as an attitude or a mode of "collective unconscious" takes hold again.

(Blackness) appears as the means by which desires in the White restrained Unconscious are able to take object-form. As Wilderson argues, "As an accumulated and fungible object, rather than an exploited and alienated subject, the Black is vulnerable to the whims of the world, and so is his or her cultural 'production'." (Wilderson 2010, 56) (Blackness) thus appears alienated in the World in the object-form that White desires take. These desires can desire things that are lost in the World, but they can never desire and take into account losses and desires are constitutively excluded from appearing among the things of the World. There is a difference of kind between (Black) desire and White desire. The latter appear as "normal desires" because they are a priori attainable or achievable in the "thought-world." They are thought to be attainable because they are desires in the World. As Wilderson reminds us, however, "No slave, no world. And in Addition, as Patterson argues, no slave is in the world. (Wilderson 2010, 11) This is a matter of desire that is intrinsic to the structure of the Unconscious. Wilderson notes this split subjectivity within himself when he says "But my huge weight fluctuation doesn't mean that when I'm thin and sick, that the world has gotten better for me as a Black person. I have to keep reminding myself that I am struggling for something for which there is no coherent articulation (Wilderson 2014, 16-17)". While the things of the World may appear as desires for Wilderson, they are but sublimated desires, repressed desires enacting an ontological ruse of analogy between normal desires and (Black) desires. This ruse is between desires that are within and outside the World.

#### Their frame of radicality relies on subjective vertigo as they seek to overcome the conceptual framework of the 1AC’s Impacts. The Black psyche experiences object vertigo, the inability to experience particular grammars of self-actualization absent the white gaze that overdetermines subjectivity. This loss of loss itself cannot never be captured within a revolutionary but can only be disrupted by investigating the unconscious.

Wilderson 20 [Frank B. Wilderson, professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine, “Afropessimism”, page 245-248, JMH]

Throughout this book I have argued that the Black is a sentient being though not a Human being. The Black’s and the Human’s disparate relationship to violence is at the heart of this failure of analogy. **The Human suffers contingent violence, violence that kicks in when he resists (or is perceived to resist) the disciplinary discourse of civil society’s rules and laws. But Black peoples’ saturation by violence is a paradigmatic necessity, not simply the performance of contingency.** To be constituted by and disciplined by violence, to be gripped simultaneously by subjective and objective vertigo, is indicative of a life that is radically different from the life of a sentient being who is constituted by discourse and disciplined by violence when he breaks with the ruling discursive codes. **When we begin to assess revolutionary armed struggle in this comparative context we find that Human revolutionaries (workers, women, gays and lesbians, postcolonial subjects) suffer subjective vertigo when they respond to the state violence with revolutionary violence; but they are spared objective vertigo.** This is because the most disorienting aspects of their lives are induced by the struggles that arise from intra-Human conflicts over competing conceptual frameworks and disputed cognitive maps, such as the American Indian Movement’s demand for the return of Turtle Island vs. the U.S.’s desire to maintain territorial integrity, or the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional’s (FALN) demand for Puerto Rican independence vs. the U.S.’s desire to maintain Puerto Rico as a territory. But for the Black, that is, for the Slave, there are no cognitive maps, no conceptual frameworks of suffering and dispossession that are analogous with the myriad maps and frameworks that explain the dispossession of Human subalterns. The structural violence that subsumes Black insurgents’ cognitive maps and conceptual frameworks also subsumes my intellectual and creative efforts as a writer. As a Black writer I am tasked with making sense of this violence without being overwhelmed and disoriented by it. In other words, my writing must somehow be indexical of that which exceeds narration, while being ever mindful of the incomprehension the writing would foster, the failure, that is, of interpretation were the indices to actually escape the narrative. The stakes of this dilemma are almost as high for the Black writer facing the reader as they are for the Black insurgent facing the police and the courts. For the intellectual act of embracing members of the Black Liberation Army as beings worthy of empathic consideration is terrifying. **One’s writing proceeds with fits and starts that have little to do with the problems of building the thesis or finding the methodology to make the case. As I write, I am more aware of the rage and anger of my reader-ideal (an angry mob as readers) than I am of my own desires and strategies for assembling my argument. Vertigo seizes me with a rash of condemnations that emanate from within me and swirl around me.** I am speaking to me but not through me, yet there seems to be no other way to speak. I am speaking through the voice and gaze of a mob of, let’s just say it, White Americans; and my efforts to marshal a mob of Black people, to conjure the Black Liberation Army, smack of compensatory gestures. It is not that the BLA doesn’t come to my aid, that they don’t push back, but neither I nor my insurgent allies can make the case that we are worthy of our suffering and justified in our actions and not terrorists and apologists for terror who should be locked away forever. How can we be worthy of our suffering without being worthy of ourselves? I press on, even though the vertigo that seizes me is so overwhelming that its precise nature—subjective, stemming from within me, or objective, catalyzed by my context, the raging throng—cannot be determined. I have no reference points apart from the mob that gives no quarter. **If I write, “Freedom fighter,”** from within my ear **they scream, “Terrorist”! If I say, “Prisoner of war,” they chant, “Cop killer”!** Their denunciations are sustained only by assertion, but they ring truer than my painstaking exegesis. No firewall protects me from them; no liberated psychic zone offers me sanctuary. I want to stop and turn myself in. The Black psyche emerges within a context of structural or paradigmatic violence that cannot be analogized with the emergence of White or non-Black psyches**. The upshot of this is that the Black psyche is in a perpetual war with itself because it is usurped by a White gaze that hates the Black imago and wants to destroy it. The Black self is a divided self or, better, it is a juxtaposition of hatred projected toward a Black imago and love for a White ideal: hence the state of war.** This state of being at war forecloses upon the possession of elements constitutive of psychic integration: bearing witness (to suffering), atonement, naming and recognition, representation. As such, one cannot represent oneself, even to oneself, as a bona fide political subject, as a subject of redress. Black political ontology is foreclosed in the unconscious just as it is foreclosed in the court, for the “black ego, far from being too immature or weak to integrate, is an absence haunted by its and others’ negativity. In this respect the memory of loss is its only possible communication.” It is important to note that loss is an effect of temporality; it implies a metonymic chain that absence cannot apprehend. Put differently but no less to the point, “loss” indicates a prior plenitude, “absence” does not. **Loss is an impoverished and inaccurate concept when deployed to think about Black suffering.** And the paucity of its explanatory power is also part and parcel of the paucity of the analogies politicos draw between Black insurgency and the insurgency of other oppressed beings. **This is not about playing oppression Olympics, as some would have it; it’s about making critical assessments of what have heretofore been insufficiently comparative analyses of the multiracial wretched of the earth;** specifically, **what has been missing is sufficient comparison between the gratuitous violence of social death and the contingent violence of colonial, class, and gendered subjugation: a comparative analysis of the dead and the living.**

#### Leftist counter-hegemonic resistance use a unique form of terror on black thought as it ignores any possibility for realizing black desires further locking the absolute dereliction of blackness.

Wilderson 20 [Frank B. Wilderson, professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine, “Afropessimism”, page 220-222, JMH]

It would be misguided, even mendacious, to have said to the people in the van that the Patriot Act did not affect Black people; or to champion an anti-immigration sentiment of any sort. But it would be just as misguided and mendacious to suggest that the Patriot Act’s relative corruption of the integrity of the Bill of Rights, or the relative rigidity or elasticity of access to (and within) the institutionality of civil society, can help us think through Black folks’s unique grammar of suffering. Put another way, **Black thought (and therefore Black liberation) is threatened not only by the state, but by the interests and actions of the loyal opposition in the airport shuttle.** In fact, Black thought is threatened by a three-tiered ensemble of terror. Our intellectual capability to do the work is not what’s at issue here. What’s at stake is our capacity to work against the constraints of analogy, the terrorism of intra-Human exchange—the hydraulics of my ride to the airport. **First, there is the terrorism of what Gramsci referred to as “political society”: the police, the army, the prison-industrial complex. Second, there is the terror of civil society’s hegemonic blocs and its clusters of affilial formations: like the mainstream media, the university, or the megachurch.** But **there is also a third tier of terror with which Black thought must contend. And that is the terror of counter-hegemonic and revolutionary thought: the logic of White feminism, the logic of working-class struggle, the logic of multicultural coalitions, and the logic of immigrant rights. The unrelenting terror elaborated whenever Black people’s so-called allies think out loud.** The stakes of this three-tiered terror are high because of their impact upon Black people’s capacity to capture and be captured by our own imaginations. **These three tiers scaffold the death of Black desire. And our capacity to imagine and to fantasize while assuming our position is imbricated in our capacity to think theoretically: to give our political desire “objective value.”** This third tier of terror that threatens the imagination and the enunciation of Black thought—the terror of left-wing counterhegemonic alliances—should not be dismissed as incidental or inessential, nor should it be trivialized as an ensemble of bad attitudes that can be overcome through dialogue, as the Race Rave conference in Santa Cruz had assumed. For it is an essential terror; it is as constitutive of an anti-Black world as the military and the megachurch. It doesn’t simply kill or warehouse Black thought the way the first tier kills and warehouses the Black body. Nor does it simply crowd out a Black emancipatory ensemble of questions the way traditional organs of hegemony crowd out the performance of the common man or woman’s ensemble of questions. **This third tier terrorizes through an interdiction against Black performance, coupled with a demand for Black performance—dance, Johnny, dance. We might say that it demands the performance of Black thought, albeit under erasure**. It wants us to sing the blues; but instead of those Ain’t Got No Life Worth Living Blues (instead of the social death blues), it wants Black folks singing the:

—Ain’t Got No Green Card Blues —Ain’t Got No Abortion Blues —Ain’t Got No Right to Privacy Blues —Ain’t Got No Border-Crossing Blues —Ain’t Got No Same-Sex Weddin’ Blues —Ain’t Got No Ciba Lubbaties Blues

Civil society expands and contracts to accommodate or diminish (but never banish carte blanche) a multitude of positions and identities—Jews, Arabs, Asian Immigrants, Latinos, Italians, White women, and Native Americans. The annals of history show nineteenth century transitions from territories to states as being manifest with a great and conflicting diversity of views with respect to all of these groups. These fledgling fifty states even found themselves, on rare occasion (as in the case of California), debating the civic and social membership of Native Americans. But civil society would not know the boundary, the frontier, of such debates, which is to say it would lose all coherence and not be able to draw the line between social life and social death, if not for the presence of Black folks. Black people hold that line for White people and for everyone else. **Blacks give even the most degraded position a sense of human possibility because we are the locus of human impossibility. Whatever grace others may fall from, they will never be Black**. This is a comforting thought. The flame of human warmth. There’s something organic to Blackness that makes it essential to the construction of civil society. But there’s also something organic to Blackness that portends the destruction of civil society. There’s nothing willful or speculative in this statement, for one could just as well state the claim the other way around: there’s something organic to civil society that makes it essential to the destruction of the Black body. Blackness is a positionality of “absolute dereliction,” abandonment, in the face of civil society, and therefore cannot be liberated or be made legible through counter-hegemonic interventions. Black suffering is not a function of the performance(s) of civil society, but of the existence of civil society. For the Pakistani driver, the White professor, and his White wife, civil society is an ensemble of constraints and opportunities. But for the Black, civil society is a murderous projection. In light of this, **coalitions and social movements—even radical social movements like the Prison Abolition Movement—bound up in the solicitation of hegemony, so as to fortify and extend the interlocutory life of civil society, ultimately accommodate only the satiable demands and legible conflicts of civil society’s junior partners** (such as immigrants, White women, the working class), **but foreclose upon the insatiable demands and illegible antagonisms of Blacks.** In short, **whereas such coalitions and social movements cannot be called the outright handmaidens of anti-Blackness, their rhetorical structures, political desire, and their emancipatory horizon are bolstered by a lifeaffirming anti-Blackness; the death of Black desire.**

#### The only Black desire is to end the World. The point is not success, but the creation of a Black Joui-sans-Jouissance, which finds joy in the impossibility of achieving its object—your role is to perform Black non-analysis, to frustrate the White unconscious which can only comprehend our demand as recuperating particular losses rather than the generalized loss which characterizes Black experience.

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However, what defines the (Black) generalized Unconscious is a different kind of loss that functions by a unilateral duality that allows one to see the double losses of the White restrained Unconscious as determined in the last instance by an immanent loss. If (Blackness) is always already defined by loss within the framework of ontology, then the Unconscious of (Blackness) which is (Blackness) outside the confines of ontology would be, as David Marriott puts it in his book Haunted Life, the need to deal with the "loss of loss". In short the (Black) generalized Unconscious appears as lost within metaphysical sovereignty because the White restrained Unconscious forces the former to lose itself. It acts through the notion of of transference or the "bending-back [of] the unilaterality (of) the Unconscious through an imaginary identification that is also a denial of the subject (of) science." (Laruelle 1989, 516) The subject of science here is the (Black) analyst. Denying the "loss of a loss" the White restrained Unconscious attempts to project onto the (Black) generalized Unconscious a loss that loses itself, wherein the (Black) generalized Unconscious can no longer identify itself. The White restrained Unconscious refuses to take the analyst's desires into consideration and instead "bends-back" the strict unilaterality of the Victim-in-Person in order to project its Imaginary desires onto the analyst. As Laruelle says of the Victim-in-Person in General Theory of Vic- tims, "the victim is twice victim, once as wronged in a criminal act, and a second time by effacement, albeit legally of the injury that had been suffered, an effacement whose publicity offends the victim (Laruelle 2015b, 64)". The ontological murder of (Blackness) is the first victimization by ontology and the second is the misrepresentation of the victim, the effacement of his desires by those who represent him. Transference thus acts as a re-iteration of the primal scene of ontological victimization, a repetition compulsion. The (Black) analyst here must teach the White analysand to overcome this repetition-compulsion.

The White restrained Unconscious must overcome this repetition-compulsion in order to acknowledge the desires of the (Black) generalized Unconscious. To see this another way Laruelle says that "[Restrained] analysis can only go as far as a half-loss, only going up to the mid-reunion. 3 (Laruelle 1995, 202) And it is this half-loss that is the transference of White desires onto the (Black) generalized Unconscious. It is the White restrained Unconscious telling the latter that all its losses and desires fall under the category of "normal desires". From this perspective there are no (Black) desires. It is not the case of these double losses that they are so absolute. Rather they are double, because they can never be attained and the loss loses itself all over again. They can never be attained because the loss is not immanent, it is not lost enough. The White restrained Unconscious has not lost enough. (Black) loss does not appear in the concept of White loss for the very reason that the latter does not exist. White loss only keeps losing itself. (Black) loss is already murdered within the metaphysical dictates of the Greek Self and Judaic Other of the White restrained Unconscious. There is then a ruse of analogy or philosophical decision made between the losses of the White restrained Unconscious and the (Black) generalized Unconscious. There is a "structural adjustment" that functions by making the "loss of loss" appear like "half-losses". The latter represses the former, which would be the end of the World as ontological field. As Laruelle argues, "The World is the Authority of Authorities, whereas the One defines the order of Minorities or Strangers." (Laruelle 2013, 168) The World is the authority on desires, creating the realm of normal desires between the Self and Other. Similarly, because the desires of the White restrained Unconscious take place in the World, these normal desires pathologize absolute loss as too radical, too (Black), too much a movement to a loss that is One. But a (Black) non-analysis attempts to put an end to the plane of half-loss itself, by "trying to destroy the world." (Wilderson 2014, 20) This is an attempt to destroy the World as the plane of realizability on which desires can occur. Daniel Colucciello Barber argues that the world is also given twice, the "world-as-given and the world-as-possible," (Barber 183) and that the essential structure of analogy is this given twiceness. Connecting these themes to post-secularism and AfroPessimism, he argues that the World would then be the ruse of analogy, or the very ruse of ontological appearance. I would like to further add that the World is a ruse of the White restrained Unconscious. The World is the plane on which the double losses of the White restrained Unconscious occur. The question of the (Black) generalized Unconscious would be that of withdrawing libidinal investment in the World and the normal desires that adhere to it always-already murder (Black) desires. The opening up of the White restrained Unconscious to the (Black) generalized Unconscious would be the desire to end the World.

(Black) Non-Analysis

The movement to the (Black) generalized Unconsicous proceeds from the recognition of the desire to end the World. The end of the World opens up the way to the generalized Unconscious and the conception of an absolute loss. Laruelle identifies the position of the generalized Unconscious in the following way:

The generalized Unconscious is the affect (of) loss, the a priori but immanent phenomenon (of) a loss without object. Loss lived as such by the subject rather than a loss affecting a subject. And if loss is an absolute and positive affect where "nothing", neither object nor world, neither being nor Being is lost, it signifies that there is nothing to retrieve or make return. There is a jouissance itself (of) loss, a non-thetic jouissance of the Unconscious where all is suspended without having to return and is thus lived in an immanent way in conformity with what is specific to man's essence. (Laruelle 1989, 518)

This is very similar to what Jared Sexton outlines as the "social life of social death": [Afro-pessimism] is a willing or willingness, in other words, to pay whatever social costs accrue to being black, to inhabiting blackness, to living a black social life under the shadow of social death…The affirmation of blackness, which is to say an affirmation of pathological being is a refusal to distance oneself from blackness in a valorization of minor differences that bring one closer to health, to life, or to sociality. (Sexton 2011, 27)

For Laruelle, the generalized Unconscious is constituted by an absolute loss. But this absolute loss, because it is absolute, must itself be lived in joy. This loss never loses itself. It never loses itself in a need to be re-found elsewhere in the White restrained Unconscious. It never needs to be re-found, re-attained, re-achieved. And because it never loses itself, it is lived as immanent Identity. As Katerina Kolozova argues, "In non-philosophy, enjoyment and suffering no longer establish opposition. They are both instances of the lived, of the sheer experience that takes place as 'suffering'…One is subjected to a sensation, be it pleasure or pain, which place in the defenseless body through the instance of pure exposure or vulnerability (Kolozova 96)". This what in Theorie des Etrangers Laruelle calls Joui-sansJouissance, or the simultaneous lived experience of joy and pain without having to search for a jouissance that loses itself in an object. He says, "Joui is a stranger to the philosophical Ego, to the subject as "individual", always already divided, mixed eventually by jouissance in its philosophico-analytic concept (Laruelle 1995, 222)". Jouissance here denotes for Laruelle a divided enjoyment, one that was outlined by the concept of the double loss, an enjoyment that is always attenuated by a further loss. Joui, however, is without object. Similarly, Sexton argues that

Fanon says that he wants to liberate the black man from himself, not repair his selfesteem or correct his misguided worldview or reacquaint him with some traditional way of life—not to heal him, but to liberate him. And liberation does not mean (only) to return the fruits of his formerly exploited labor or (only) to return the sovereignty of his people over their formerly colonized land or (only) to return control over the uses of his formerly enslaved body. Those are the external conditions, as it were. He must (also) be liberated from himself, from his self, from his desiring self. (Sexton 2017)

Because (Blackness) is already alienated and murdered in the World, to liberate the (Black) man from himself is not to return or re-find any external object of loss, but rather to destroy the field onto which (Blackness) ends up being projected, so that (Blackness) can enjoy itself as Joui-sans-Jouissance. The move to the (Black) generalized Unconscious is thus a conception of identification with itself in the last instance and a liberation of the (Black) man from himself. What Laruelle calls the Joui-sans-Jouissance is an immanent loss and affirmation, the experience of the (Black) self as such beyond historical and ontological transcendence, but nevertheless taking these transcendences into account, whether through the Middle Passage, on the auction block, or during the recent shootings in Ferguson, Missouri. As Sexton further argues, "separation, as psychoanalysis has shown powerfully, is a precondition for any relationship whatsoever." (Sexton 2017) The (Black) generalized Unconscious is not constituted by any particular losses, desires, or separations. What constitutes the (Black) generalized Unconscious is not separation or loss of the mother, of a native land, of property, or of any external factors. It is constituted by ontological loss or the very fact of loss and separation in and of themselves, the fact of social death and slavery. As such, the willingness to pay whatever, any and all, past and future social costs there are to being (Black) and affirming them is perhaps the necessity of formulating a (Black) generalized Unconscious. Moreover, if it is loss and separation themselves that belong to the (Black) generalized Unconscious, then there is an absolute jouissance of loss. Because this loss can never be realized in an object, there is nothing to regain. What belongs to the (Black) generalized Unconscious is immanent Identity itself. Such an immanent Identity is the domain of freedom. This Identity and desire is a separation from all transcendence, especially the World, since (Blackness) has never belonged to the World.

The subject of this immanent identity and this beginning point of freedom can be thought of as the (Black) non-analyst. Why the (Black) non-analyst? Laruelle says, "The subject (of) science is the veritable "analyst" in what we will call "non-analysis", and there is only a non-analyst who identifies itself with this subject and its immanent posture." (Laruelle 1989, 516) There is no analytic scene of analyst and analysand in Laruelle's nonanalysis. However, the (Black) non-analyst here is the immanent identity of the White restrained Unconscious. It is the (Black) non-analyst to whom loss belongs to as Identity. The former sees from the perspective of the Vision-in-One. The "end of the World" as outlined by Afro-Pessimism can be thought of as the means by which the (Black) non-analyst works on the transcendental material of the White restrained Unconscious from the perspective of the Vision-in-One. It works on the desires of the White restrained Unconscious as an analyst works on the desires of an analysand, changing them morphing them, so that the latter can see from the perspective of the One. The end of the world denotes the end of metaphysical sovereignty and the identification in the last instance of the (Black) generalized Unconscious and the White restrained Unconscious. In Laruelle's Theorie des Etrangers he argues that Stranger is a "Self that is neither subjective nor objective, but immanent (to) itself, so that it is no longer divided between Self and Other, this one being no longer interior or exterior and exterior to the Self, but the Self exists immanently also itself, without "leaving" itself in a new structure which is that of the Stranger-it exists-Stranger." (Laruelle 1995, 13) This Stranger-Self can be used to describe the (non)-position of the (Black) generalized Unconscious. It is neither subjective, nor objective, partaking of neither Self nor Other, but radically constitutive of the Self/Other dynamic. Laruelle argues that this consists of an "ego-xeno-logic" in which the Stranger is the immanent identity of each Human being. The Slave for Wilderson is similarly constitutive of the Human insofar as it gives birth to the World and the Self/Other dynamic. Anthony Paul Smith further echoes this argument by saying that "to be a Stranger to oneself is not to be an Other to oneself, but to be without any stable reference point in the world, to be separated ultimately through one's radical immanence (to oneself) from the world." (Smith 2016, 103) The Stranger-Subject as the Slave is the radical Identity of the Unconscious insofar as it takes the lived experience of history into account. The (Black) non-analyst must be the immanent identity of the philosophical subject that lives in history so as to be constantly working on the latter's desires as transcendental material from the perspective of immanent loss.

I am not here arguing that the (Black) Human being and the White Human being are identical, even in the last instance. What I am arguing is that the Stranger-Self of the White restrained Unconscious is the (Black) generalized Unconscious. The latter is not the Other of the White restrained Unconscious, but rather the immanent identity of the Unconscious (to) itself when it opens itself up to the desires of (Blackness) by ending the World, since (Blackness), since the Stranger do not exist in the World, but rather sees the desires of the World from its perspective.

Laruelle argues that "The closure of the Unconscious by the symptom-form in turn falls into the generalized Unconscious, and this symptom-form (including the other "forms") is no longer merely the object of a displacement and of a restrained analysis, but of an emplacement (my italics) by the universal or abstract Unconscious and of a dualysis that transforms it into simple material." (Laruelle 1989, 521) Instead of functioning by displacement or condensation, through the end of the World, there is an emplacement from the point of view or according to the (Black) generalized Unconscious. This is not an emplacing into as if the White restrained Unconscious were "larger" than the (Black) generalized Unconscious, but rather a postural change of perspective wherein the former is a site or location of analysis for the latter. There is a certain indication of the "placing-in" of foreign desires, desires that are not my own. The desires that come from the perspective of the (Black) non-analyst are far more opaque and expansive. They are not immediately the desires of my Ego, but they are the desires of the Stranger or Slave that is the immanent identity of my transcendental Self and Other, insofar as it takes world-history into account in the last instance. Thus, the desires of the Self and Other, the White restrained Unconscious, are seen as One from the perspective from the (Black) non-analyst. As Laruelle argues in his short essay "Universe Black in Human Foundations of Colour", "The [Black] Universe isn't the object of thought, a greater object than the World; it is thought's how or its according to." (Laruelle 1988, 402) The universe is far larger than the World, far more opaque, a superposition of wave and particle. To see according to perspective of the (Black) nonanalyst is to see from the Vision-in-One. From this perspective the (Black) non-analyst "works" on the metaphysical desires of the White restrained Unconscious, the desires outlined above as "normal desires". In this sense, as Laruelle himself and his commentators have noted, Non-Philosophy, and in this case Non-Analysis is not a negation of psychoanalysis but rather its expansion or dualysis in the sense that one would use the phrase "NonEuclidean". Thus, "a generalized analysis necessarily re-introduces into the sphere of analysis everything excluded, therefore psychoanalysis itself and as such with the ensemble of its decisions of the "non-analyzable." (Laruelle 1989, 520) There is therefore an expansion of desires of the White restrained Unconscious from the perspective of the (Black) nonanalyst, since the latter expands the analyzable range of the former.

Wilderson argues that the metaphysical position of the "Savage" or indigenous peoples is partially constituted by genocide and sovereignty since the Savage's desires are that of reclaiming a lost sovereignty to the land taken from them. However, it is clear, that from the perspective of the White restrained Unconscious, this desire for a reclaiming of some kind sovereignty other than metaphysical is made but a pathological desire, one that cannot fall within the metaphysical sovereignty of Whiteness. In this sense "the (genocidal immunity) of Whiteness jettisons the White/Red relation from that of a conflict and marks it as an antagonism: it stains it with irreconcilability. Here the Indian comes into being and is positioned by an a priori violence of genocide." (Wilderson 2010, 49) Seeing from the perspective of the (Black) non-analyst as the identity immanent to the generalized Unconscious, it works on the White restrained Unconscious so that the Savage's desire becomes a semimetaphysical desire capable of being desired and realized. This is a desire that cannot appear within the restrained losses of White metaphysical sovereignty. But since seeing from the point of view of the (Black) non-analyst puts them into chaos, new desires from the perspective of the One are introduced. Proceeding from this perspective (Black) nonanalyst, there is the possibility of replacing the White restrained Unconscious with a MultiRacial Unconscious.

(Blackness) insofar as it appears as the (Black) non-analyst immanent to the (Black) generalized Unconscious or the Stranger-Subject already exists outside the World as immanent identity by virtue of its loss, which is why the desire to end the World is the necessary movement that allows the White restrained Unconscious to see from the perspective of the (Black) generalized Unconscious. Insofar as this is true (Blackness) is the minimal perspective for a radical subjectivity, and the minimal perspective for freedom and the articulation of new desires that are seen as One from the point of view of the (Black) non-analyst in the last instance.

#### You should refuse their forced choice of action or injustice—endorse the indeterminacy of black passivity as a psychoanalytic injunction against the demand for action that reproduces racial violence

Sexton, 17—Associate Professor of African American Studies and Film and Media Studies at the University of California, Irvine (Jared, interviewed by Daniel Barber, Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Pace University, “ON BLACK NEGATIVITY, OR THE AFFIRMATION OF NOTHING,” <http://societyandspace.org/2017/09/18/on-black-negativity-or-the-affirmation-of-nothing/>, dml)

JS: I think you’re right to draw this link between “an aikido according to [or with] blackness” and my earlier, speculative thoughts on black feminist violence as a practice of “response per se, a defense without positive content.” We are, in a very basic way, always responding to the world, to ourselves, to the world in ourselves, to ourselves in the world, more than we are initiating, in thought and action. Any initiative or initiation would seem to be marked as such by a kind of permanent time lag or belatedness in which all thought is afterthought and all action is retroaction. But, then, we are also always active in that fundamental responsiveness, so much so that even passivity (whether waiting or resting or languishing) is a type of activity, that of our active being, that which brings forth life from the non-life with which it is commingled. Our being is active, but that doesn’t mean our being is always in-action. Why, in our political and intellectual circles, all the pointed concern about activity, why the worry, or fear, about being misunderstood as passive, individually and collectively? And why the close association between being passive and being victim or between passive-being and victim-being? Indeed, that tension between active/passive states provides the principal ground for the symbolic and material production of differences of race, gender, sexuality, class—all differently arrayed for different reasons, of course.

I’m reminded, on that note, of a question Wilderson asked me years ago about an often overlooked passage in Fanon, from his critique of Octave Mannoni in Chapter 4 of Black Skin, White Masks, where Fanon is meditating on the aim of his vocation as a politically engagé mental health clinician. (I have some thoughts, by the way, on what I think Fanon misses in his reading of Mannoni in my article, “Curtain of the Sky”). Here’s the passage:

As a psychoanalyst, I should help my patient to become conscious of his [their] unconscious and abandon his [their] attempts at a hallucinatory whitening, but also to act in the direction of a change in the social structure. In other words, the black man [person] should no longer be confronted by the dilemma, turn white or disappear; but he should be able to take cognizance of a possibility of existence. In still other words, if society makes difficulties for him [them] because of his [their] color, if in his dreams I establish the expression of an unconscious desire to change color, my objective will not be that of dissuading him [them] from it by advising him [them] to “keep his [their] place”; on the contrary, my objective, once [their] his motivations have been brought into consciousness, will be to put [them] him in a position to choose action (or passivity) with respect to the real source of the conflict—that is, toward the social structures (Fanon, 2008b: 74-75).

So, Fanon moves initially from this deceptively recognizable psycho-political activist guideline, where the unreason of alienated compliance gives way to the reason of disalienated resistance, to a parenthetical clinical modulation, where he no longer seeks to enable action per se, and action in a particular direction at that, but rather decision; decision in the proper sense, rather than the forced choice, the vel, of hallucinatory whiteness: “turn white or disappear.” No decision can be made within the terms of a forced choice, Fanon reveals, only a decision about the terms of its imposition. (Aside: the Philcox translation has it as: “whiten or perish.” I like the Markmann phrasing better here because it stays with the dynamics of hyper/in/visibility that Fanon is exploring, the peculiar problem of overdetermination from without, which is to say of anti-black racialization, of victimized appearance, but also of a certain ethics or aesthetics of disappearance that we can glean from a reading of Fanon. Kara Keeling (2007) and Huey Copeland (2013) and Simone Browne (2015) have elaborated on this nexus generatively in their respective work.)

Wilderson’s question was to the effect of: What would a properly decided, freely chosen, passivity toward the social structure look like? Is there such a thing—ethically, politically—as radical passivity? (I ended my first book with a slightly modified reference from Thomas Carl Wall’s (1999) text bearing that very title. I wonder about this genuinely still and tend to think, yes, there is such a thing.) Žižek, to take another well-known example, has played on the pop psychological notion of “passive aggressive behavior” in his withering critique of so much leftist activism today. In The Parallax View, he writes:

perhaps, one should assert this attitude of passive aggressivity as a proper radical political gesture, in contrast to aggressive passivity, the standard ‘interpassive’ mode of our participation in socio-ideological life in which we are active all the time in order to make it sure that nothing will happen, that nothing will really change. In such a constellation, the first truly critical (‘aggressive’, violent) step is to withdraw into passivity, to refuse to participate—Bartleby’s ‘I would prefer not to’ is the necessary first step which as it were clears the ground for a true activity, for an act that will effectively change the coordinates of the constellation (Žižek, 2009: 342).

### 1NC – Labor

#### Focus on the political economy obscures libidinal violence AND neglects that white solidarity trumps working-class coalitions. Black subordination is the stage for class conflict

Issar 21, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts, Amhers. (Siddhant, “Theorising ‘racial/colonial primitive accumulation’: settler colonialism, slavery and racial capitalism”, *Race & Class*, Vol. 63(1), pg. 36-38, https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396821996273)

To be sure, the pivotal political-economic role of slavery in fuelling national and global capital accumulation is not new. A plethora of scholars throughout the twentieth century, though with differing emphases, have shown how nineteenthcentury capitalism was inextricably dependent on Black slave labour. As Du Bois argues, ‘Black labor became the foundation stone not only of the Southern social structure, but of Northern manufacture and commerce, of the English factory system, of European commerce, of buying and selling on a world-wide scale.’58 Yet, revisiting the ways racial slavery and capitalism were linked remains important given the tendency in certain strands of Marxism to categorise slavery as pre-capitalist because the slave was not ‘free’ and the liberal freedom of the worker is taken to be the sine qua non of capitalism.59 In opposition to this tendency, the anti-Black relation reveals the ways slavery, as a mode of racialised expropriation, anchors the ‘unfree’ end of the labour spectrum and, like the colonial relation though in a radically different way, forms a precondition for the exploitation of normative wage-labour.

Looking at racial slavery solely through the lens of productive labour, however, fails to capture the ‘libidinal economy’60 of slavery. That is, the specificity of slavery as a regime of violence, domination and accumulation, including but not limited to the ways gendered, sexual and reproductive labour enabled and was conscripted to capital accumulation.61 Rather than bracketing the libidinal economy from the political economy, the anti-Black relation offers a dialectical reading of these constitutive aspects of racial slavery withoutreducing gratuitous anti-Black violencesolelyto a function of capital**.** Saidiya Hartman, for instance, troubles Du Bois’s and C. L. R James’s use of the category ‘worker’ to represent the slave, arguing that this move ‘obscures as much as it reveals’.62 In demonstrating how Black women’s labour exceeds the figure of the Black worker as conceptualised by two exemplars of Cedric Robinson’s Black radical tradition, Hartman at once draws attention to the ‘presumptive masculinism’ of this tradition, while simultaneously deepening this tradition’s insights.63 We can build on Hartman’s insights to connect two interconnected levels of gendered, racialised expropriation at the heart of racial slavery: the labour of the slave as a worker and the gendered labour of social and biological reproduction.64 In the context of the capitalist world-system, these two layers of political-economic and gendered, reproductive expropriation congealed in the institution of chattel slavery, accumulating profit for not only planters and slave owners, but also a vast intercontinental network of merchants, financiers, industrialists, states and corporations. In a direct sense, capital’s exploitation of wage-labour in the North and in Europe was premised on the expropriation of Black slave labour, including the reproductive capacities of Black women.

At the same time, the Black slave, by being confined to the ‘unfree’ end of the labour spectrum, gives stability and meaning to the ‘free’ white male proletariat. Here, the role of racial slavery in the social order troubles any simplistic binary between the political and libidinal economies of anti-Blackness. Expanding on Du Bois’s insight about the ‘public and psychological wage’, a compensatory set of privileges extended to poor whites in lieu of their status as ‘not Black’, scholars such as David Roediger and Joel Olson have argued that the ‘wages of whiteness’ helped consolidate a white cross-class alliance.65 This class collaboration between capitalists and a significant segment of white workers is the foundation of the white supremacist racial order, ensuring the undisturbed accumulation of capital in and through the preservation of Black subordination. White supremacy, in other words, stabilised the inherently exploitative system of American capitalism by [obstructing] ~~retarding~~ the development of a strong interracial working-class movement. Drawing on Du Bois’s Black Reconstruction, Olson states,

Du Bois shows that racial oppression is a form of social control that perpetuates class relations. The white working class serves as a buffer control stratum between capitalists and the rest of the working class, facilitating social stability by holding down Black workers. But Du Bois shows that race does more than exclude, divide, degrade, and repress. It is also a productive form of power that accumulates humans into particular groups in order to produce relations of docility-utility. It does this through a peculiar arrangement of class relations, which are secured through various privileges granted to members of the dominant race. This cross-class alliance between the capitalist class and a section of the working class is the genesis of the American racial order.66

What is especially insightful about Olson’s analysis of anti-Black racial domination, emerging from his reading of Du Bois, is that race is not simply exclusionary, divisive and repressive. Rather, race is also productive, generating a web of social relations that manages the contradictions between capitalist society and egalitarian visions of a democratic order.67 Resting on the structural relegation of enslaved (and free) Black populations to the bottom of the social order, the historical effect of this white cross-class collaboration is that it has provided stability for American democracy ‘by reconciling political equality with economic exploitation through a system of racial privilege and subordination that deflects attention from class, gender, and other grievances’.68

The expropriation of Black labour is a key motive force structuring Black subordination. I use the term expropriation to emphasise the distinction between capital’s extraction of surplus value from Black labour and capital’s subjection of ‘free’ wage-labour. Even with the transition from slavery to wage-labour following the Civil War, it remains necessary to avoid collapsing anti-Black domination as simply a product of capitalist exploitation.69 This is because racism, and antiBlack racism in particular, remains productive of the American social order in a way that the concept of ‘capital relation’, by itself, cannot capture. Two important clarifications are necessary here. First, the argument I am making is not transhistorical. The relations between race, labour, capital accumulation and resistance are mutable and variable across time. However, I am suggesting that there are certain historical continuities in the ways white supremacy and identification with whiteness have fractured working-class struggles across the history of American capitalism.70 Second, in connecting the libidinal economy of slavery and anti-Blackness to political economy, I am not arguing that white supremacy is merely an extension of capital’s logic. While the psychic and material effects of gratuitous anti-Black violence do indeed reinforce and reproduce capitalism, the framework of the libidinal economy affords insight into how ‘white sadism’, ‘white enjoyment’ and the pleasures derived from this violence more generally exceeds the grid of political economy.71

#### Reject Dartmouth’s reading of the Mills evidence---even if its right, the aff doesn’t shift dominant group makeup in a racially equitable manner, which means the plan is not radically liberal

#### Dartmouth can’t access the Bang evidence---its about Foucaultian politics and the nature of politics, which their state-first approach inherently denies---reject it

#### The presumption that markets can be post-racial as a matter of inclusion is an attempt to efface history and rescue race from blackness, located as absent relationality or agency.

Dumas 13 (Michael J., Assistant Professor at the University of California, Berkeley in the Graduate School of Education and the African American Studies Department, “’Waiting for Superman’ to save black people: racial representation and the official antiracism of neoliberal school reform,” Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, 34:4, 2013)

The rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s shifted the relationship between governmentality and race; while in earlier periods, the state positioned itself as the leader in advancing antiracism, under neoliberal multiculturalism , it is neoliberal economic policies and ideological formations that are seen to resolve the problem of racism. The market, in this hegemonic frame, knows neither race nor racism, and is therefore regarded as best suited to facilitate racial equality. Neoliberal multiculturalism promises to usher in the post-racial period, by nurturing a new global citizenship centered around economic participation. ‘ In short ’ , Melamed contends, ‘neoliberal multiculturalism has portrayed an ethic of multiculturalism to be the spirit of neoliberalism ’ (p. 42). In doing so, neoliberal multiculturalism abandons any explicit mention of race. While liberal multiculturalism employed discourses of equity, diversity and freedom, ‘ now open societies and economic freedoms ... and consumerist diversity signify multicultural rights for individuals and for corporations ’ (p. 43; italics in original). Neoliberal multiculturalism is still attentive to racial difference and recognizes inequitable outcomes, but explains these differences as essentially not about race or (in) justice, but individual and group choices. As Melamed explains: Neoliberal-multicultural racialization has made this disparity appear fair by ascribing racialized privilege to neoliberalism ’ s beneficiaries and racialized stigma to its dispossessed. In particular, it has valued its beneficiaries as multicultural, reasonable, law-abiding, and good global citizens and devalued the dispossessed as monocultural, backward, weak, and irrational – unfit for global citizenship because they lack the proper neoliberal subjectivity. ( 2009 , p. 44) In contrast to black stigmatization under liberal multiculturalism, here the focus is on the distance between black subjects and the market. Through the neoliberal-multicultural lens, we can still feel sympathy to the extent that these subjects are perceived as being prevented from participating in the market. However, if they reject opportunities to participate in the market, no matter how rigged that system may be, then our sympathies can be justifiably withheld. Any argument that the economic sphere is already regulated by racial privilege will fall on deaf ears, as the market is already presumed to be multicultural and racially ethical (i.e. post -racial) on its face. I want to suggest that, even in a neoliberal-multicultural period, we can still identify elements of racial liberalism and liberal multiculturalism. History is never erased or transcended; dimensions of the previous periods are evident in our national-racial imagination and in the racial representations that inform and are informed by that imagination. Waiting for Superman as a cultural and political product Near the beginning of Waiting for Superman (Guggenheim, 2010 ), Harlem Children ’ s Zone founder and so-called education ‘ reformer ’ , Geoffrey Canada, recalls his childhood disappointment in learning that Superman is not real. ‘ Even in the depth of the ghetto ’ ,he explains to the off-camera interviewer, ‘ you thought, he ’ s coming. I just don ’ t know when, because he always shows up and he saves all the good people ’ . As he speaks, images of a young Canada fade to black, interspersed with images of George Reeves as the hero in tights in the 1950s TV series, Adventures of Superman : I asked my mom, do you think Superman is – she said, Superman is not real ... and I said, what do you mean, he ’ s not real? And she thought I was crying because it ’ s like, Santa Claus is not real, and I was crying because there was no one coming with enough power to save us. In inspiring the title of the controversial documentary, Canada presents an image of a poor urban black community without a sense of hope, innocent but helpless in the face of social, economic and spatial marginalization. A people in need of a savior, the young black boy reckons, would do well to appeal for help to the ultimate all-American (white) superhero. Here, his city neighborhood becomes constructed as an uninhabitable jungle (Leonardo & Hunter, 2007 ). Unlike in some rightist interpretations, the black residents of Canada ’ s ghetto are not to blame for their condition, but instead are victims of something unnamed, a tragic historical accident. Blameless, they earn our sympathies; however, they clearly do not have enough agencies to help themselves. Or as Canada suggests, poor African Americans are so far gone, their salvation may require someone with superhuman powers. The producers of Waiting for Superman use Canada ’ s childhood memory to frame the film ’ s heartbreaking, liberal racial narrative, in which racial inequities are bemoaned without any acknowledgment of racism, (good) people of color eschew collectivist racial politics, and black subjects in particular are quick to point out their own personal moral and emotional failures as the cause of their own low educational aspirations and attainment. Waiting for Superman is significant as a cultural and political product, because it has been largely embraced by corporate education reformers like wealthy philanthropists Bill Gates and Eli Broad, and because of its harsh critique of teacher unions and uncritical praise for private educational-entrepreneurial ventures like KIPP and Teach for America. Although the film generated a massive critical response from academics and progressive education advocates (see, for example, http://www.notwaitingforsuperman.org ), it enjoyed a generally sympathetic and often enthusiastic response everywhere else, from glowing newspaper and magazine stories, to favorable coverage by influential media personalities like Oprah Winfrey and Katie Couric. Waiting for Superman is also important, because it is perhaps the most influential popular-discursive effort to advance a new managerialism in education reform. Manage- rialism, as Michael Apple ( 2006 ) explains is led by an emerging group of middle-class professionals committed to using business models of profit, competition and efficiency to ‘ reform ’ education (and other public institutions and functions). This entails privatizing some schools, and financially and politically undermining remaining public institutions, which are then forced to compete with these marketized schools. Ultimately, then, the argument can be made that private entities can more effectively deliver services that have previously been understood as public, as part of our collective responsibility for the public good. Managerialism is ‘ an ideal project ’ , Apple contends, ‘ merging the language of empowerment, rational choice, efficient organization, and new roles for managers all at the same time ’ (p. 25). Waiting for Superman is, in effect, a managerialist manifesto for education in the United States. What we learn in examining racial representations in the film is exactly how mangerialism aims to win for the rightist project a certain innocence vis à vis racism, and more, a sense that racial progress depends on adopting conservative ideology and reform policies. The story arc of Waiting for Superman , its primary suspense, centers on a competitive public lottery system in which children and their families vie for a severely limited number of student spots in highly-regarded charter schools. It is The Hunger Games in reverse; here, those not selected are presumed to be the unfortunate ones, condemned to suffering and abuse, while the masses watch. And like that blockbuster motion picture, Waiting for Superman is a cultural product, not simply a documentation of truth, or policy, or everyday life. The filmmakers construct a dramatic plot, with messages embedded in the images and also made explicit in the text. We meet the families, hear them share their struggles and dreams, and explain what they believe accounts for their own educational and/or social marginality. The filmmakers intend to evoke enough sympathy that as the film comes to its dramatic final scenes, we are emotionally invested in the outcome, anxious to discover if the students will be offered admission, as the number of still available seats becomes smaller and smaller. In most cases, the families experience crushing disappointment, which allows opportunities for wrenching close-ups of terrified eyes, tear-stained cheeks, and hands still clenching strips of paper with losing numbers. To a great degree, the filmmakers need, perhaps the audience too needs, or at least desires, to see suffering. Not only does it help the filmmakers make their argument about the state of public education, but it is also better theater, more compelling entertainment. Ultimately, our own humanity is affirmed, because we care so much about these strangers on the screen. In one particularly moving scene, we see a Latina mother, Maria, touring a Harlem charter school where she hopes her first-grade son, Francisco, will win a spot, to escape his low-resourced school in the South Bronx. Maria is clearly impressed with the resources of the charter school, and looks longingly at the warm, inviting classrooms. ‘ I don ’ t care if we have to wake up at 5 o ’ clock in the morning in order to get there at 7:45 ’ , she says, almost plaintively. ‘ That ’ s what we will do ’ . But, as the New York Times later reported (Otterman, 2010 ), when this scene was filmed, Maria already knew that Francisco would not get to attend this school. The scene was staged after the lottery, in order to ‘ see her reaction to the school, and her genuine emotion ’ , according to director Davis Guggenheim. For him, the scene was ‘ real ’ because the pain and longing in her eyes revealed her excitement about the possibility of having her son attend the charter school, although it might also be argued that they exploited her pain for their own purposes. It is certainly not uncommon for documentary filmmakers to re-enact and re-order scenes; my point here is to underscore that Waiting for Superman is produced , and produced in ways which evoke not only specific emotions, but produce and reproduce certain cultural discourses and ideological formations. As a racial cultural product, the film provides images of racialized bodies and differences that seem natural largely because they draw upon the familiar or the popular, that which we already accept about race, and more specifically here, blackness. As Herman Gray ( 2005 ) explains, ‘ the movement of black images and representation is never free of cultural and social traces of the condition of their production, circulation, and use ’ (p. 21). Hence, what I want to highlight in my analysis of the film is the ways in which black social actors take their (expected) place within the broader ideological conditions of official antiracisms – speaking, gazing and even moving on screen in support of that grander narrative. As I have hinted, if not said explicitly thus far, neoliberal multiculturalism, in conjunction with managerialism, brings an inherent effort to move beyond the black- white racial paradigm. This is more than an acknowledgment of a fuller plane of racial diversity, but an ideological position in which ‘ black ’ is understood as anachronistic, passé and a threat to national progress. Jared Sexton ( 2008 ) is worth quoting at length: Modernizing the nation – at least the segment of the nation with the potential to be ‘ more than black ’ or simply to move ‘ beyond black ’– and liberating it from the deadening weight of the past requires that the signature of its persistence ... be effaced. In this light, multiracialism can be read ... as an element of the ascendant ideology of colorblindness, but it is not thereby identical to it. Its target is not race per se, since multiracialism is still very much a politics of racial identity ... but rather the categorical sprawl of blackness in particular and the insatiable political demand it presents to a nominally postemancipation society. ( 2008 ,p.6) Neoliberal multiculturalism, or what Sexton calls multiracialism, seeks to rescue racial identity from blackness, which is seen as largely responsible for giving race its offensive and oppositional signification. The neoliberal-multicultural cultural product, then, finds effective ways to situate blackness and black bodies as absent of rationality or agency, and black racial politics an ineffective explanation of, or solution to persistent racial inequity. I am not suggesting that there is a direct line between racial representation and racial intent. That is, my aim is not to provide evidence that the film is racist, or that the filmmakers were motivated by racism. Rather, my argument is that the film was produced, and enters a field of already existing cultural productions, in which race and blackness have already been and continue to be imagined discursively, and in which black bodies are situated materially, disproportionately among the poorest and least regarded. What becomes important and potentially destructive about Waiting for Superman is the extent to which its representations reproduce and reify antiblack imaginations, ideologies and sentiments, even as the filmmakers claim to have offered a cultural product – an officially antiracist cultural product – that advocates for poor black people and other marginalized racial groups.

#### Legal focus replicates a cycle of cruel optimism and empirical failures that solidify the settler state’s authority and redirect black energy from community-building to courtrooms.

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Conversely, wake work is about paradoxically clinging to life amidst death and catastrophe. The game has been lost. There is no pre-slavery Blackness. There is no un-murdering, no un-spilling of blood. There is no available expulsion of a foreign power, as in the case of Gandhi's India, nor is there any reason to foresee or hope for a surrender of our government structures to Indigenous folk, as in Mandela's South Africa; apartheid is perfected here. Outside of worldwide upheaval, the state – this crystallized settler colony – is here to stay, as are the scars on the peoples residing in the underbelly of society, which holds up the rest of it. 30 The hold is sturdy, and those who have been disposable are still disposable; as a matter of policy, the starved in history can still be starved, the historically captured can still be captured (e.g., arrested and incarcerated), and so on. 31 What would it mean for lawyers to practice from this place of containment, from apparent defeat? Not primarily from an obligation to universal ideals or political affiliations as Delmas describes, but from a collective mourning and hunger? How might "politics" and "obligations" be recast in the wake, and how might we triage them? Starting from the first analysis of divided loyalties, how might lawyers thinking from within the wake determine the relative weights of our obligations to the law and to those on the margins? What does the law mean to us who are already always the living dead, those whose deaths make the world possible?32

As scholars and movement lawyers have long explained, a singular focus on legal remedies for the marginalized in our context has several pitfalls and other shortcomings. First, concentrating solely or even primarily on the systemic reform of the legal system and/or direct client services has not worked. To be sure, it is no longer legal, strictly speaking, to segregate schools based on race, 33 but housing and school segregation persist.34 Lynching is technically illegal, but it persists. 35 Police still kill Black people, Black children, legally and illegally. 36 Mass incarceration has been decried by some, 37 and yet prisons, along with a visceral, systemic need to punish, also persist and are levied against Black people in particular, who have always been necessarily capturable.38 Some voting rights for Black people were secured on paper,39 but they have since been both resisted in practice and rolled back formally. 40 Wealth inequality between Black people and white people has ballooned over time, and, even more harrowingly, inequalities in life expectancy between Black people and white people still exist. 41 I do not mean to dismiss the steps toward reducing these inequities that have been made through the law or by legal actors. But, as discussed earlier, these injustices are not accidents or anomalies; they are constitutive parts of the system as it currently exists, and they mean something about who in this country can (still) be hurt and stolen from and about what this country is. Appealing to such a system to change itself has not been proven effective on its own, as many scholars have observed; forms of state oppression merely shift from one form to another.42 These so-called reforms leave the violent core of the nation intact because they must; the underlying, necessary penchant for anti-Blackness and the domination of Indigenous peoples has remained as the lifeblood of the nation-state. 43

Second, along these lines, appealing to the state for relief reinscribes the state, the coercive power it uses to effectuate its ends, and our own status as Black (non)subjects. 44 As Anthony Farley explains, praying to the state for relief is to accept the power of the state to say "yes" but also its power to say "no": "To request equality is to surrender before one begins. To request equality is to grant one's owners the power to grant or deny one's request. To grant one's owners such a power is to surrender oneself to one's owners entirely and completely." 45 To recognize this power is to submit to the law's (necessary) privileging of its interests those that give it coherence and legitimacy: the erasure of Native American peoples and the infliction of perpetual suffering upon Black people as punishable, malleable, detestable flesh 46 -over our own:

To pray for legal redress is to bow before the authority of law .... Law is only the relation of white-over-black to white-over-black to white-over-black. When we follow a legal rule we follow only the track that we have ourselves laid down. In other words, we ourselves are track, we become the track when we lay down, and we follow that track white-over-black into the future that lasts forever.47

Third, as various scholars have observed, focusing on legal redress to the exclusion of other tactics and remedies, which lawyers are prone to do, has the potential to block the building of power in the communities those lawyers serve, creating serious problems in movement work.48 For example, such a focus often contains social action and energy within the domain of the courts, as opposed to building sustainable structures and practices within the community itself." There is a lurking tendency for lawyers, because of our conservative, risk-averse training, to quell radical thought and tactics-in the name of precedent and rationality-and instead bow to the law.5 Because strictly legal approaches often rely on the unique credentials, skill set, and language of lawyers, such approaches can center and empower lawyers in movement strategy, rather than empower activists and members of the community.51 A law-focused approach tempts lawyers and community members alike to conflate the lawyer's role with that of an organizer, which is problematic because lawyers and organizers tend to employ different frameworks and techniques." Our legal system tends to atomize legal disputes and claims, often forcing legal proceedings into person-against-person conflicts and making it difficult for collective legal action, coalition building, and redress of harms on a community level.53

#### Moral reforms by the state are coopted not to reduce harm, but increase it---calls for helping others only mask the articulation of blackness as a threat to the smooth functioning of a white supremacist government

Sharron, 19 - Kelly Christina Sharron, Doctorate in Philosophy from the University of Arizona, 2019(“THE CARING STATE: THE POLITICS OF CONTRADICTION IN FERGUSON, MISSOURI,” Proquest Dissertations Library, bam)

Introduction: The Politics of Care: Feminism, Feminist Theory, and the State

This dissertation emerged out of an ongoing interest in state power, particularly as it relates to the carceral state. The conversation and events that overwhelmed these topics, for me, have been police violence. The shooting of Michael Brown, an unarmed black teenager, by white officer Darren Wilson in Ferguson, Missouri became a national story, and framed what would become ongoing attention to police brutality. Moreover, the degree to which the police force and National Guard responded with military equipment, weapons, tanks, and riot gear sparked debate about what role police forces play in communities, if they have overstepped their authority, and the legitimacy of protest. While these are all important and worthy contributions, what seemed more troubling was the way that people readily accepted the solutions offered by the state. These solutions, and the rhetoric surrounding them, are what I have framed as “care.” They included things like community policing, accountability, and soft reforms like body cameras. As more unarmed people of color were killed by the police, it became immediately clear that the solutions offered were not enough to upend the problem, policing itself.

One of the most popular images to circulate after the Ferguson grand jury decision is one of a young black boy in an embrace with a white cop during a protest taking place in Portland, Oregon. This photo was shared over 400,000 times on Facebook, and marked a desire for reconciliation without meaningful change. The police officer appears to be comforting the boy, who is sobbing; it marks a tender moment between two differently affected groups, as though this could have been Wilson and Brown under different circumstances, if only they would have exhibited more care. In telling the story behind the photo, the pictured police Sgt. Bret Barnum approached the boy, Devonte Hart, who was holding a “free hugs” sign, “not as a police officer but just as a human being” (Grinberg 2014). Barnum continued, “it really solidified what all of us do this work for – this job for – to create good will” (Grinberg 2014). This isn’t the only “feel good” photo to circulate, there were other hugs, high fives, sharing food, etc. that all indicated this sense of peace and racial harmony. This sentimental moment between officer and person of color demonstrates a will and desire to care. These moments of sentimentality, as embodied in the state, are at the center of this dissertation. They foster the feeling that policing could be about good will, and that the state doesn’t necessarily intend to commit harm.

It is not just that the caring solutions and rhetoric offered by the state were ineffectual. These responses actually produce more harm. What on face appears to be contradictory aims and effects of state power, violence and care, are actually integral to each other. The reforms and sympathetic rhetoric offered by the state do not contribute to less policing, but rather extend policing. Rather than take on the serious critiques of policing, these reforms are offered as a way to harmoniously and surreptitiously continue and exacerbate the violent effects of policing. As it became clear in the years that followed, reforms failed to substantially affect police brutality, and in fact helped to short circuit some of the critiques about policing, all the while making the state appear kinder and gentler.

This dissertation investigates this range of political effects, from the violence and militarization to the use and popularization of care as a technique of re-legitimization and extension of state power. Brown’s death was not the first killing of an unarmed black person by a white officer to rise to public attention, but it did garner a particular resonance among activists, political officials, and the media. This dissertation takes stake in two particular moments: the death of Brown and the grand jury’s decision to not indict Wilson. These moments sparked larger questions about the function of the criminal justice system and who is afforded legal protections. The criticism of the grand jury decision and Ferguson policing practices culminated in a Department of Justice (DOJ) investigation that found racial injustices and disproportionately distributed revenueraising practices. In looking to care as a state technique, this dissertation examines media, state, and activist discourses surrounding the death of Brown, as well as the historical and political context of St. Louis. Using a cultural studies framework, I examine these discourses and archives asking: What are the particularities of Ferguson that catalyzed such a response? What is the context in which racist policing practices emerge? How does the political system admit injustice while also maintaining the fiction of colorblind democracy? This dissertation reveals the nuances and contradictions of state practice with respect to history, space, militarization, and justice. Finally, I consider the practices of social movements and the possibilities of incorporating care into more revolutionary frameworks amidst state-based care.

I situate my discussion of the shooting of Michael Brown in four fields of study: feminist theory, state theory, cultural studies, and political geography. I deploy feminist theory to understand how difference is made meaningful and contributes to disparate life outcomes; state theory to contextualize this iteration of statecraft with regard to care and violence; cultural studies to read and interpret language, discourse, and texts that are made meaningful through power; and political geography to discuss the impact of processes of spatialization and differentiation on policing practices. As I argue, in the contemporary U.S. landscape, state power relies on violence alongside inclusion, sympathy, and recourse. While Brown was shot in an act of violence, and the Grand Jury resulted in a legal violence, the subsequent responses of the Attorney General, President Obama, and the Department of Justice illustrate the ways in which the violence of the state is reoriented into rhetoric of justice, sympathy, and impending equality. Both violence and the more insidious operations of power are necessary to the functions of the state.

Brown’s death has a continued resonance in the ongoing attention to police violence, yet it was not the first, last, or most extraordinary. While Ferguson lies at the heart of this dissertation, I explore the political, social, and cultural milieu in which Ferguson is situated and articulated. Amidst a background of ongoing police militarization, dominant frameworks seek to maintain that blackness, as a constellation of ideas projected on and embodied in particular people, is the threat to American peace and justice rather than the extra-/illegal actions of the police. This dissertation seeks not only to unravel this claim, and demonstrate the racist ideologies that guide police action under even its most benevolent forms, but also to demonstrate the racist, gendered, sexualized, and classed underpinnings of the most idyllic of terms and aspirations from the state, and the ways in which these contradictions are actually critical to its function. The events in Ferguson exceed the geographic and political stakes of the event itself. Ferguson is instructive to the larger context of police and state power. Brown’s death is not an isolated instance, and protest and social movements do not respond to Brown alone. Rather, Brown’s death points to the larger milieu of racist policing practices—past, present, and future—taking place in Ferguson and across the United States over generations. Stuart Hall et. al's Policing the Crisis (1978; 2013) provides a framework and model to think about the significance of a singular event (in their case, the Handsworth mugging) and its relationship to the social milieu. Of their method, they say: Our concern was to use such a starting point – concrete events, practices, relationships and cultures – to approach the 'structural configurations that cannot be reduced to the interactions and practices through which they express themselves'... we sought to emulate the ethnographic imagination but also to move beyond the focus on the here and now of everyday 'interactions and practices' by locating them in the histories taking place behind all our backs (Hall et al. 1978; 2013, xi).

The text shuttles between the historical context, the Handsworth mugging, the symbol of the mugger, the state, the media, and the structuring logics of law and order. I follow the method put forth in Policing the Crisis to describe the events in Ferguson, but also their larger histories, contexts, representations, and effects. I also describe the expressions of care and their contextualization amidst violent rhetoric and effects.

Care

Sara Ahmed opens The Cultural Politics of Emotion (2015) with a question: “How does a nation come to be imagines as having a ‘soft touch’? How does this ‘having’ become a form of ‘being’, or a national attribute?” (Ahmed 2015, 1). Deeply personal, and personalized, attributes like emotions, feelings, and orientations, take on a national form, and are narrated as traits of the nation. Taking Ahmed’s description of national emotions as a starting point, I explore these questions throughout: How are emotions imagined to be part of collective bodies and institutions? What are the implications of imagining care as an institutional activity or affective orientation? What does it mean to make the police care?

In The Care of the Self (1986) Michel Foucault talks about care as pertaining to the body and the soul, as a means to cultivate and perfect oneself. Foucault describes the evolution of care:

It took the form of an attitude, a mode of behavior; it became instilled in ways of living; it evolved into procedures, practices, and formulas that people reflected on, developed, perfected, and taught. It thus came to constitute a social practice, giving rise to relationships between individuals, to exchanges and communications, and at times even to institutions. And it gave rise, finally, to a certain mode of knowledge and to the elaboration of a science” (Foucault 1986, 45).

Foucault describes a shift in care from the self to more general realms like medicine, knowledge, and institutions. Care is an orientation toward the self, as well as to objects. Foucault provides the scaffolding to think of care as extending beyond the self, or relations between people, and to thinking about the state and police as institutions of care, or as institutions involved in caring relations. In other words, the state has the capacity to care, to invoke care, for its citizens.

The meaning of care includes many dimensions including care for the self, care for others, and institutionalized care. Care most often describes a relational, ethical orientation, which eschews individualism in favor of communitarian ethics (See Engster 2005; Thomas 1993). These discussions and various viewpoints on care are related to the central terms discussed by Ahmed and Foucault, namely the integration of care into institutions and the projection of care, feelings, and emotions onto national bodies. I briefly consider care and caring, particularly as they have been developed in feminist ethics and theory, as feminine, ethical, interdependent, blurring public and private spheres, and finally when oriented to the state. While the meaning of care and its implications are often debated and discussed, care is generally portrayed as a panacea to political problems with very little consideration of what some potential pitfalls of care, or how care could be mobilized in malevolent ways.

#### Labor focus is a liberal discourse of inclusion that masks the singularity of black fungibility.

King 14, Assistant Professor of Women's, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Georgia State University. (Tiffany, 6-10-2014, "Labor’s Aphasia: Toward Antiblackness as Constitutive to Settler Colonialism", *Decolonization*, https://decolonization.wordpress.com/2014/06/10/labors-aphasia-toward-antiblackness-as-constitutive-to-settler-colonialism/)

For the past few weeks a convergence of social media discussions on reparations, Shona Jackson’s book Creole Indigeneity: Between Myth and Nation in the Caribbean, and her recent post “Humanity beyond the Regime of Labor,” as well as my own thinking about Black Studies’ engagement with Conquest have all compelled me to think critically about the issue of Black labor.[1] I would like to take a moment to focus on the conceptual limits of labor as an epistemic frame for thinking about Blackness (as bodies and discourse) and its relationship to settler colonialism. I am particularly concerned about the ways that Black labor may crowd out Black fungibility as a conceptual frame for thinking about Blackness within settler colonial discourses.

While many scholars who understand themselves as humanists have long ago conceded that strict or heavy-handed Marxian (political economic) analyses are generally impoverished and wanting; labor as an analytic persists. Indeed, labor as a discourse, or what Shona Jackson would call a “metaphysics” and “ontoepistemology”—a way of living and a way of articulating this mode of living— still haunts our critical theories (Jackson, 2012, p. 217).[2] This is particularly true as scholars undertake the difficult work of understanding and naming how racialized people are situated within White settler colonial states. Configuring People of Color into the calculus of settler colonial relations is onerous and in fact laborious. It is especially difficult when trying to conceptualize the unique location of Blackness. I commend scholars for taking on this task.

In order to do this cumbersome work, scholars tend to rely on the tried and true rubric of labor. Labor becomes the site and mode of incorporating non-Black and non-Indigenous people into settler colonial relations in White settler nation-states. People of Color scholars often rehearse histories of arrival as populations of coerced labor as a way of explaining their presence, as well as distance or proximity to the category of the Settler. Labor also becomes a liberal discourse that allows immigrants and migrants to narrate the terms of their belonging and citizenship within White settler colonial states. In this way, labor functions as another discourse of inclusion. Recently, Jamilah Martin in response to Ta-Nehisi Coates’ article “The Case for Reparations” made a similar and astute point in her blog post “On Reparations: Resisting Inclusion and Co-optation” that reparations work as a discourse of inclusion within the project of American Democracy within the “U.S. anti-Black settler-imperial state.” While the integrationist project of reparations may be a liberal project of inclusion, it also relies on a “teleology of modern labor” (Jackson 2012, p. 147). It holds out hope for Black inclusion into a human family of laborers/workers. Yet, despite the claim of the Black laborer as “subject”, embedded within the metaphysics of labor, the bill H.R. 40 (otherwise known as the Reparations Bill) has not gained traction.

H.R. 40’s lack of success partially speaks to the inability of Blackness to become fully legible through human categories like the laborer/worker. Further, it evinces the ways that laborer and worker do not explain the ontological state of Blackness. In Red, White and Black, Wilderson attends to the ways that Afropessimists “have gone considerable lengths to show that, point of fact, slavery is and connotes an ontological status for blackness; and that the constituent elements of slavery are not exploitation and alienation but accumulation and fungibility (Wilderson 2010, 14). The “alienation” and “exploitation” that the human worker experiences through labor are contingent conditions resulting from human conflicts.

Many people can and have occupied these temporary and conditional abased human coordinates. White, Asian and South Asian, Latina/o and Middle Eastern indentured and other kinds of laborers have long inhabited White settler territories and nation-states and, as laborers, immigrants and migrants have all helped build the settler nation. Black laboring bodies have even been used to build the settler nation. However, Black labor is just one kind of use within an open, violent and infinite repertoire of practices of making Black flesh fungible.

One way that I have explained fungibility to my undergraduate students in my course “Gender and Sexuality in the African Diaspora,” is to think about the slave owner Madame Delphine LaLaurie’s use of enslaved bodies in the FX television series, American Horror Story: Coven. LaLaurie uses Black flesh to meet uses and desires beyond those of labor and profit. She runs a torture chamber in order to satisfy lusts that include and exceed the sexual. In one episode, she murders and then uses the blood of an enslaved newborn child as an elixir that wards off the aging process. One gets a sense that the possibilities for Black flesh are unending under her ownership.

The infinite possibilities for fungible Black flesh mark a fundamental distinction between fungible slave bodies and non-Black (exploited) laboring bodies. Further, Black bodies cannot effectively be incorporated into the human category of laborers. If Black laboring bodies were incorporated into the category; “laborer” would have no meaning as a human condition. Blackness is constituted by a fungibility and accumulation that must exist outside the edge and boundary of the laborer-as-human. If there were no Black fungible and accumulable bodies there could be no “wage laborer” that cohered into a proletariat.

While labor as a discourse may work for non-Black and non-Native people of color as a way of interpellating themselves within settler colonial relations, it does not explain Black presence, Black labor or Black use in White settler nation-states. Theories that attempt to triangulate Blackness into the Settler/Native antagonism in White settler states do so by positing Blackness as the labor force that helps make the settler landscape possible.[3] It is true that Black labor literally tills, fences in and cultivates the settler’s land. However, this singular analysis both obscures the issue of Black fungibility and reduces Blackness to a mere tool of settlement rather than a constitutive element of settler colonialism’s conceptual order.

Fungibility represents a key analytic for thinking about Blackness and settler colonialism in White settler nation-states. Black fungible bodies are the conceptual and discursive fodder through which the Settler-Master can even begin to imagine or “think” spatial expansion (King, 2013). The space making practices of settler colonialism require the production of Black flesh as a fungible form of property, not just as a form of labor. In Scenes of Subjection, Saidiya Hartman argues that the enslaved embody the abstract “interchangeability and replaceability” that is endemic to the commodity (Hartman, 1997, p. 21). Beyond, the captive body’s use as labor, the Black body has a figurative and metaphorical value that extends into the realm of the discursive and symbolic. What Hartman names as the “figurative capacities of blackness,” allows the Settler-Master to conceptualize Blackness as the ultimate sign for expansion and unending space within the symbolic economy of settlement (Hartman, 1997, p. 7; and King, forthcoming). Blackness is much more than labor within both slavery’s and settler colonialism’s imaginaries.

Like Hartman, I argue that Blackness’ figurative capacity and interchangeability has a life—or afterlife—within the discursive and spatial projects of settler colonial expansion (King, forthcoming). Settler colonialism requires a symbol of infinite flux in order to animate and imagine its spatial project (King, 2013). In my dissertation, In the Clearing, I argue that Jennifer Morgan’s book Laboring Women: Women and Reproduction in New World Slavery, configures Black women as spatial agents who are [symbolically] essential to the settlement of land during the colonial period in the coastal regions of the South and the West Indies. In fact, the Black female body must be discursively constructed in order to make it possible to even conceive of planting settlements during the “first generations of settlement and slave ownership” in South Carolina and Barbados (Morgan, 2004). Morgan argues that 18th century settlement required particular symbolic constructions and particular uses of the Black female body (Morgan, 2004, p. 26).[4]

Black fungibility represents this space of discursive and conceptual possibility for settler colonial imaginaries. Black fungible bodies work beyond the metrics and “metaphysics of labor” in White settler colonial states (Jackson, 2012, p. 215). Labor becomes a limiting frame for conceptualizing Blackness on White settler colonial terrain. Reimagining Blackness and theorizing anti-Black racism on unusual landscapes requires that we rethink the usefulness of convenient and orthodox epistemic frames. We must venture beyond labor and its limits in order to think about settler colonialism’s anti-Black modalities. Fungibility and other frames deserve our attention as we continue to think about anti-Black racism, Native genocide and the US settler-slave (e)state.

## Block

### Kritik

#### business as usual DA- 2AC framework arguments are an attempt to return to business as usual -- weighing the case and the K as a “middle ground” is a racialized politics of tolerance that can’t wait to change the channel and return to “real scholarship” MSU recognizes. Overcorrect your desire to go back to the “scheduled programming” that “we all expect”.

**Suh ’19** [Sharon; May 13; Professor of Buddhism at Seattle University; *Buddhism and Whiteness: Critical Reflections*, *Philosophy of Race*, “Chapter 1,” p. 5-7]

“WE INTERRUPT YOUR REGULARLY SCHEDULED PROGRAMMING TO BRING YOU THIS VERY IMPORTANT PUBLIC SERVICE ANNOUNCEMENT . . .”: AKA BUSINESS AS USUAL IN THE ACADEMY

“We interrupt your regularly scheduled programming to bring you this very important public service announcement. . . .” Many of us grew up with this interruption, eyes glued to Saturday-morning cartoons, cereal bowl and spoon in hand. Or maybe it was the regular evening sitcom—an important announcement appears on the screen, the spectator watches with some concern, but maybe grows restless with the interruption of their televised fantasies, and then the programming we all expect and have invested in comes back on screen. I was reminded of these televised public service announcements while participating on a recent panel on power, privilege, and identity in American Buddhisms at the annual conference of the American Academy of Religion in 2017. The panel presenters included critical remarks on whiteness, class privilege, and sexual difference to a largely white audience of Buddhist Studies scholars who attended presumably to listen to some of the leading voices in Buddhism and difference. However, as the panel proceeded, it became readily apparent that the majority white audience was merely tolerating our scholarly interruptions (albeit with growing agitation) and that they could not wait to return to their regular programming of presentations analyzing Buddhist sutras or “real” scholarship. In other words, they wanted to change the channel on us and return to the disciplinary discussions they recognized— those that did not need to mention whiteness and that did not need to include much discussion of the simultaneity of identities that comprised much of the panel—Asian and Asian American Buddhist scholars, a queer white scholar from England, a white female scholar who studies whiteness and Buddhism, a black gay Buddhist lama, and myself—a second-generation Korean American cisgendered woman who studies Buddhism, gender, and race.

After the first few discussions of sexuality, the panel moved to the theme of race and that is when I began to sense in my bones that feathers were ruffled. Somehow, a presentation on sexuality was acceptable, but as soon as the term whiteness was uttered and whiteness in American Buddhism brought to the forefront, especially by an Asian American female body, there was a palpable shift in the room. I was not performing race in the ways the audience expected after all, for I began by troubling the whiteness in the room, the academy, and in sangha spaces. Our scholarly audience that was presumably here to listen to what we had to say about power and privilege began to fold arms over chests, shift in chairs, and the façade of exasperation and shut down ensued. They were not here for the purposes of genuine engagement and the egoless listening and epistemological humility that Charles Johnson offers as the foundations of Buddhism, but rather, out of a desire to gaze at difference with curiosity which soon turned into displeasure.13 They were there to witness the temporary disruption of their regular programming (an uncritical study of Buddhism steeped in Orientalist flavoring and racial superiority of whiteness and white normativity) and to show their support—tolerance—for diversity so they could return to their regular programming and business as usual.

In my own presentation, I spoke about the importance of acknowledging the hypervisibility and hyperinvisibility of people of color in American sanghas and studies of Buddhism in the West and how solid scholarship should engage in the requisite of interrogating power and privilege which induced sighs that seemed to complain “oh, this again?” I addressed the investments in whiteness that the field of Buddhist Studies has made and the costs of marginalization, racism, and minoritization of their knowledge meted out on people of color in the academy and in American sanghas. While their body language spoke volumes, their mouths remained silent. In the follow up question and answer, not one white scholar wanted to engage my explicit critique of Buddhism and whiteness. The experience was like a pin dropping—a silent but potential threat. As I gazed out at the audience, I could only see people of color with smiles on their faces; I got vigorous shakes of the head, thumbs up, and wide vocal applause. It was as if the only people in the room listening were the other people of color; white scholars neither challenged me nor expressed congratulations. In my hypervisibility I became invisible again. I was a flash on the screen giving a public announcement about whiteness and white supremacy and in an instant the channel returned to business as usual.

I am not sure why I was surprised by how the panel and presentation transpired; after all, it follows a formulaic storyline. This seems to be the way that spectatorship works with whiteness—a white gaze falls upon the spectacle of a person of color who has entered the guild, listens for evidence of their right to be part of the guild, notes the person’s failure to engage in “real scholarship,” and quickly returns to the gaze upon itself. It was in the question and answer period that I reached for my Buddhist killjoy survival kit and quickly devised an expedient mean to shift the dynamics of the panel itself, for several white male scholars of the audience began to pose exceptionally long questions about subjects not related to our panel and proceeded to answer the questions themselves. In so doing, they recentered whiteness as once again all eyes were on them; they attempted to reestablish that their words were the product of serious scholarship and that our time in public was up.

A seemingly endless debate about largely unrelated issues ensued as several white scholars in the audience began to pose critiques in the form of questions they themselves had the answers for and, in so doing, they shifted the attention of the room onto themselves. We, the actual panelists, were now sitting in the back of the room as the white male scholars suddenly recentered themselves and reestablished whiteness as the prevailing norm. I quickly decided in that moment that I no longer wished to be on air in this strange exhibition of power and privilege. I suddenly reached out for another Buddhist killjoy, one whose support I needed for my survival kit. I turned to the Buddhist lama, looked him in the eye and said, “I think we should have a moment together.” Shifting our gaze away from this curious spectacle of whiteness, our eyes locked and he said, “yes, let’s have a kumbayah moment” as he picked up my hands. Although the gesture was spontaneous, I reached out to the lama as another Buddhist killjoy, knowing that the gesture “is about the experience of having others who recognize the dynamics because they too have been there, in that place, that difficult place.”14 In so doing, we became the refuge and a gem to each other and created sanctuary in the midst of whiteness. I sought out safety and the only way that I knew how in that moment was to turn to my fellow Buddhist killjoy whose work on Buddhism, sexuality, and race I had deeply admired. I wanted to make a lateral dialogical move because I knew that the programming had just returned to “normal” so I shifted the landscape. Rather than become a silent voyeur to the new mini-panel that developed as a few audience members took over the space, I reached out to my co-panelist as a refuge and a lifeline that Ahmed describes as “a fragile rope, worn and tattered from the harshness of weather, but it is enough, just enough, to bear your weight, to pull you out, to help you survive a shattering experience.”15 It was a moment of co-bearing witness to whiteness.

#### The alt alone solves- if we win they are an attempt to imagine the unimaginable then you should reject that ritualization in favor of the alternative

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In its adherence to working with fragments, to accepting the absoluteness of fragmentation and the centrality of it to Black creative work, Zong!’s destructive approach to creation offers us a name for what it is we might best do with our untimeliness in the middle of nowhere: destructive writing. M. NourbeSe Philip’s poiesis is destruction. To leap into the Black w/hole of the text, the praxis, the theory, and the interpretive method necessary to operate on the same frequency of this work is to take very seriously the untimely, stanky, political-ontological relationship between Blackness, creation, and destruction. To “make generations” in the name of defending the dead, or to do the wake work, or to conjure the Black and cosmic magic, is to reckon with the paradoxical generativeness of destruction. It is to wholly embrace violence as violence, fragments as fragments, and incoherence as incoherence, in order to actively refuse, combat, and vie to destroy the very logic, or grammar, or order that murdered, continues to murder, and threatens to wholly obliterate Black being, or whatever deranged fragments of that being remain.

What have we done? What have we been doing? What should—must—we do? As we reflect upon the shards of thought, language, literary scene, physical property, lived experience, and unbearable inquiry that form the field of fragments we call Black Study, we consider how these arrangements we have made have all been an attempt at working with destruction. Arranging and deranging, ordering, reordering, and disordering, and always looking, listening, and attending to them carefully has always been the product of a continuous negotiation of the destructive forces that turned Black life and death into fragments. We spent our textual spacetime theorizing the nature of these forces in order to both, understand how they destroy us (how they work), and to begin to consider what ways we might refract/reflect them (how we can create with and from them). My arguments have turned on establishing the significance or rethinking these spatiotemporal forces and how they shatter our existences, indeed because rethinking time and space and how they play out upon us as a project on its own will help us better grasp the nature of our subjection to the various orders and structures of the antiblack world, but also because a deeper understanding of their mechanics and their essence radically transforms how we imagine, theorize, and perform Black creation.

I/we have performed our impossible alchemy thusly: (nigredo) disintegrate our core materials—time, space, and work—shedding the ashen detritus inessential to our work and leaving only what we need; (albedo) the distillation of what remains—untime, nowhere, and refraction—into the material we can synthesize into a greater conceptualization; and (rubedo) the synthesization of a new, vexing, abstract material that might reshape our understanding of Black existence and imaginative creation—destructive writing. While we knew and know our work aims to produce an alternative theory of Black creation that embraces and works with the destructive forces that make us untimely and displace us into nowhere, we perhaps (re)discover that our work is its own negotiation of destruction, our own staging of these principles of destructive writing. That invisible force suturing the fragments surrounding us into a field, that unseen thing that amplified the call of the fragments we sought out and were able to hold and behold, that animating element of untimeliness, refraction, and being nowhere: that undergirds the whole of this work, argumentatively and creatively, is destruction, and in our endeavor to make time and space for our considerations, we contemplate and imagine and write toward an answer to our most difficult set of questions.

How to tell a shattered story, one not meant to be passed on or passed on? How to “un-tell” a story that must be told?16 How to tell an impossible story?

Perhaps it is not exactly as Sharpe says. Perhaps the goal is not to ‘imagine the unimaginable’17 but, as part of the same refusal NourbeSe writes and performs, to radically un-imagine the imaginable.

How to defend the dead, the dying, and we who live untimely lives in the middle of nowhere?

By

becoming

everybody?

No.

*By destroying everything*.

Cowrie shells drag across the hard, wet wood. A constellation has been traced in water. A spell has been cast. A conjuring has taken place. We bear the water and the witness. We are a clamor of fragments in the oceanic dark. Telling and writing impossible stories is destructive work.

Telling, writing, and living impossible stories is destructive, dangerous work when deathliness, untimeliness, and stankiness are the conditions of whenever and wherever we try to be. To really listen to Ursa Corregidora’s blues18 and take the leap into the Black hole toward total destruction is to leap toward the singular possibility of radical, unimaginable, and impossible creation. Only in the dark and clamoring shatter, only from the nowhere of there and the untimeliness of then, might we really make time and space for one another.

Nothing less, nowhere else, and with no time to spare, we leap.

### Labor

#### This is incredibly present in the 1ac---their version of what the economy looks like comes from the 1AC Steinbaum evidence, which articulates that:

In a competitive labor market, the identity of a worker’s firm is irrelevant to what he or she gets paid, because if any worker were paid less than they were worth they would quickly switch to a job offering them their competitive market wage. In a competitive labor market equilibrium, all firms pay the same to all workers with similar characteristics. In reality, though, firms have considerable discretion to dictate pay, because outside job offers are sufficiently hard to obtain that it is unlikely that workers will have the option to leave.18 In other words, labor markets are not competitive, as evidenced by the increasing earnings inequality between firms. The aforementioned research on inter-firm inequality shows that workers are increasingly remote from profits and from centers of economic power.19 Anyone familiar with the history of labor organizing, worker solidarity, and the conditions for social mobility can recognize that under those conditions, it’s impossible for workers to benefit from economic growth. An article from the New York Times in 2017 made this point by contrasting the experience of janitors working at the corporate headquarters of Kodak in the early 1980s versus Apple today. The Kodak janitor was employed by the company, enjoyed a tuition subsidy as part of her benefits package, learned how to use inventory software as part of obtaining a college degree on the job, and ultimately worked her way up within Kodak to be head of IT for the whole company. 20 Meanwhile, the Apple janitor is employed by a contracted, franchised janitorial services firm, enjoys no part of the benefits package of an Apple employee, and has no chance of obtaining a promotion up the hierarchy of what is now one of the economy’s most valuable single firms.21

#### That is evident in their piece of 1AC Rahman evidence, which says:

The freedom that domination threatens—the freedom we must seek to realize—is not the libertarian freedom of consumer choice and market transaction; it is the richer freedom to live lives we each have reason to value—a freedom that is expanded with our capacities and capabilities to have real agency in the world. In short, it is the freedom of being an agent, capable of authoring one’s own life and coauthoring collectively our shared political, social, and economic life. This is the freedom that is constrained by the accumulation of unchecked power, whether by the state, the corporation, or the market itself.